I have long been fascinated with George B. McClellan as not only a Civil War general, but as a Civil War personality as well. Here we have a man who should have been the one, single, Union military success - a man who had it all: brains, looks, youth, education, and family. And yet, there is no single Union general who managed to accomplish so little in over a year's time, with so much.

I hoped that Thomas J. Rowland's "George B. McClellan & Civil War History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman" would provide some insight into McClellan's flawed character that did not come forth from modern biographers such as Stephen Sears. Yet within Rowland's work, I was sorely disappointed.

Rowland sets forth to disprove Little Mac's critics by doing the one thing in Civil War writing that I abhor - rather than building up his subject, and letting McClellan's story stand on its own - he sets out to drag everyone else down. For some strange reason, there appears to be more and more of this going on in Civil War historiography of late, much to the detriment of our understanding of history.

Rowland sets out to outline the perceived problems with McClellan's personality and generalship, and rather than refute the contentions directly, often sets out to discredit others such as Grant, Sherman, and Edwin Stanton. If Rowland's guy cannot stand tall, then no one else will, as well. For example, we have on page 67 a typical statement of Rowland's: "The notion that McClellan was the butt of more embarrassing incidents than anyone else is greatly diminished by any extended review of the war's comical and tragic mistakes." And from there, rather than review Little Mac, Rowland sets out to review other participants on history's stage.

Rowland attempts to minimize McClellan's flaws by qualifying his admittance of such flaws throughout the book. Thus, we see Rowland admit, cautiously, that McClellan could be petty, vain, and vindictive "on occasion." In other places, his review of other historian's work is tinged with statements like "Unfortunately, that is not entirely true." The reader is left to try to ponder which portions are partially true, and partially not.

This book is not a comprehensive analysis of the life and times of General George B. McClellan, but a selected bibliography of truth and half-truth that uses only what the author wants the public to see about McClellan - and more importantly, anyone else held in higher esteem than the Young Napoleon that can be drawn down to the perceived level that history holds McClellan.

All in all, this was a very disappointing work. If you want to come to grips with the enigma that was McClellan, this book will leave you very short of your expectations.

In the chapter discussing McClellan's lesser faults, the author notes that both Grant and Sherman had similar faults, but they weren't judged by these faults nor should McClellan's strategic abilities be evaluated by his peccadilloes. Acknowledging that McClellan played a major role in his poor working relations with Lincoln, the author notes that "....the president was not frank about how military goals were to be shaped by the political dimensions of the rebellion." In addition, Stanton's dislike of McClellan did not help in the commander's poor relationship with the president. However, the author does not imply that McClellan was faultless noting "....his failure to delegate authority and his obstinate secrecy" Another fault was his unwillingness to take risks. The greatest question is whether he made the best use of the Army of the Potomac. Rowland concludes that "In any comparison with other Civil War commanders, particularly those to whom he is unfavorably compared, McClellan's personal shortcomings were not that remarkable."

Chapter 4's discussion of the early months of war provides valuable insight into the ultimate conduct of the war. The widely held Northern belief that most Southerners were not committed secessionists initially led to a limited war strategy. After the First Manassas McClellan recommended that to restore the Union in the shortest time, the North had to "crust the rebellion at one blow...." Rowland notes "McClellan's was....a well reasoned strategic proposal. His conservative views.... reflected....widespread appeal throughout the North at that time...." In support of this strategy, he launched the Peninsula Campaign which was undermined by Washington politics and lack of support. The book states

"....the half defeat on the Peninsula.... spelled the end of the conciliatory" strategy. For this campaign to succeed, joint operations were mandatory; and the author observes that in the early stages of the war, the inability of Federal armies to cooperate in joint operations contrasted sharply with the military situation Grant inherited in 1864.

The review of civilian leaders alarm regarding Washington's safety is noteworthy. Extraordinary concerns for the capital's safety contrasted with months of endless nagging McClellan to assume the offensive. However the troops needed for an offensive had to come from those providing the capital's defense. Both McClellan and Grant faced the problem of Washington's safety with McClellan trying to comply and Grant often giving only limited support. The book concludes "McClellan's Peninsula campaign, the first major Federal offensive in East, experienced problems uniquely its own, not the least....was the administration's failure to sustain plans they had.... agreed to support." During the first two war years, many Northerners believed the Confederates would be quickly defeated perhaps in one major campaign. When McClellan assumed command in 1861, he inherited an untrained and disorganized army. The author notes that McClellan implemented schools of instruction and all volunteers were given basic training directed by an experienced officer. In addition, he recognized the deficit in trained officers (several were political hacks) and arranged effective training. The book frequently notes, that the training and organizing of the army was a major contribution. Considering, the sheer folly of his predecessor's taking an unprepared army to defeat at the First Bull Run, McClellan's unwillingness to assume the offensive in 1861 with an untrained army was prudent and not excessive caution. Unfortunately, in 1862, politics and lack of support doomed his Peninsula campaign.

Rowland writes "....little attention is paid to the context in which McClellan dealt with the difficulties that faced the Federal army in the first fifteen months of the war. ....his early tenure deprived him of the advantage of leading mature and seasoned civilian soldiers, adapted to the demands of a new age of warfare...." As one historian noted, McClellan "suffered the frictions and frustrations of being first." The text notes that Sherman observed that Napoleon took three years to build an army and "....here it is expected in ninety days..." The author notes the irony that McClellan was relieved of command when "He had effectively divided Lee's army into widely separated halves, intending to drive between them. The celerity of those moves alarmed Lee...." This could have been a critical blow.

The text continues that McClellan might have been forgiven a multiple of failures had he kept his eye on the military objective, the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia. However, McClellan's strategy to capture Richmond was not without merit as Richmond was a critical manufacturing, transportation and financial center. The Tredegar Iron Works alone justified the capture of Richmond. Richmond's fall during the first two war years would have been devastating to the Confederacy. Regarding Antietam, Rowland correctly notes that regardless of McClellan's shortcomings, Antietam was a Union victory. McClellan had stopped Lee from delivering a demoralizing blow on northern soil.

The book concludes, "McClellan's strategy, though reflective of the unrealistic war aims of the years 1861-62,was cogent, reasoned, and consistent with conventional military wisdom.... McClellan can scarcely be elevated to the ranks of the great captains of war, but he was hardly the worst that the conflict dragged into the center stage."

The book is somewhat repetitious and devotes too much space to comparing McClellan's faults with similar faults of Grant and Sherman. However, the book is worth reading for its discussion of Union military and political strategy during the first two years of the Civil War.

Its major strength is the integrated approach: Sherman Lee organizes the book chronologically and thematically, rather than geographically. Instead of writing a section on Chinese art and a section on Indian art, Lee organizes his material by stage of development (Stone Age pottery) or by cultural movement (Buddhism), for example tracing the development of Buddhist styles in India, the adoption of those styles in China, Japan, and S.E. Asia, and the eventual synthesis of the Indian influences into local styles incorporating indigenous themes. Lee writes eloquently and even passionately about his subject, letting us know which cultures, styles, and artworks he admires. He covers a vast amount of cultures and time periods, easily enough material for dozens of books.

The book does have significant flaws, however. Most frustrating are the black and white photos (presumably a cost-saving measure). Roughly 90% of the images in the book are black and white, and they cannot do justice to most of the subject matter. A second weakness is Lee's writing style, which is sometimes more eloquent than comprehensible. At times I had to reread a section several times in order to figure out what Lee was trying to say. He sometimes seemes to be addressing himself to an audience of art critics who are already familiar with the material, rather than students encountering it for the first time. He will tell us that a particular art work is hieratic in style, or is an example of Daoist style, without explaining why. Also the thematic, rather than chronological, approach means that some topics are fragmented into parts of different chapters. The material on Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Tang Dynasty seemed especially disjointed. The sections on China in particular need more development: Lee provides only a single page of text on the historically pivotal Qin Dynasty, and does only a fair job explaining the influences of Confucianism and Daoism.

One alternative text that deserves consideration is The Art of East Asia, edited by Gabriele Fahr-Becker. Almost of the photographs are in color, and the text is both more comprehensive and more comprehensible than Sherman Lee, in particular the section on China. The text is written by several different authors, one for each region, which has both advantages and disadvantages -- it avoids the fragmentation of Lee's approach, at the expense of integrating it all into one consistent framework. The key disadvantage of The Art of East Asia (compared to Sherman Lee's History of Far Eastern Art) is that it doesn't include India, which contributed some of Asia's most impressive sculptures, and whose religions had tremendous influence on the rest of Asia.

I was required to use this book as a secondary text for a class on early Asian Cultures at NYU. Along with the material presented in class, this book provided great insight into basics of the Asian culture.

This rather heavy book is perfectly organized chronologically and geographically. It provides great graphical supplement to the study of early Asian art. Many artifacts are portrayed, most with detailed description of their history and origin.

I enjoyed my class greatly and this book provided great help to understanding Asian art. If you are a person who prefers visual aids rather than tons of text and would like to learn the basics of Asian art, I highly recommend this book. The photographs are excellent, and more often then not, actually motivate you to reading the descriptions of the portrayed objects. This book will not make you an expert on Asian art, but you'll be able to schmooze your way through at pretentious cocktail parties without any effort.

All in all, this book kept her occupied for several hours over the weekend. I expect that she's still having fun with it -- we bought her a stack of pipe cleaners from the local craft store.

I HIGHLY recommend this book -- it's not messy or noisy, kids like it, they can follow the book or use their imaginations, they can do the projects independently or in a small playgroup, and buying more pipe cleaners is very inexpensive -- a few dollars gets you several packets. I bet it would be a great activity for kids taking long car trips, or for rainy-day fun.

My _ONLY_ critique of this book is that they should give enough pipe cleaners for TWO of each project, instead of for just one. That way, if a child wants to play with another person, each one can make the same item. The cost of doing so should be quite small, as the the pipe cleaners are really cheap, but even if it raised the book cost by another dollar or two, it would be worth it!

This is the second Jersey shore mystery staring Anne Hardaway. The plot starts out a little slow, but quickly gains speed and doesn't slow down until the climax. There were enough twists to have me completely confused until the very last page. I love the resort town setting; the author makes it seem very inviting. The biggest problem is the little time returning characters get. Anne interacts almost exclusively with the suspects. While they're interesting, getting to see her with a few friends helps define her character better.

Anyone looking for a fun setting with complex plots need look no further. Time spent on the Jersey Shore with Anne is fun but certainly not relaxing.

If you like Sherman than this is a good book for you,though I'd suggest re-evaluating you asthetic awarness :) If your looking for great art look elsewhere. Sherman is an overhyped artist. Popular because her work fits into the politically correct agendas and philosophies of the contemporary artworld, not because the work is good. Just read one of the reviews here. The book contains some good peices, some that are atleast interesting but far to many fall into the just plain bad category as represented in this book.

While recently attending a group critique an undergradute ceramics major stated she was a "process orientated" artist(said with artsy fartsy flair to make up for the fact she really didn't have anything to show). Sherman reminds me of her, a bad contemporary cliche masking itself behind feminist artworld dogma. If thats what you want, look at Jenny Saville, atleast she is a good painter, even if her content is often trite.

Also, he seems to be rehashing the same themes and ideas that have been used in so much of his other work.

One of the stories entitled, What You Pawn I Will Redeem, is a great story. The others really were disappointing in both style and content.